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Embracing Non-ICSID Investment 
Arbitration? The Chinese Perspective 
Meng Chen* 
Abstract: This article introduces and examines Chinese arbitration institutions’ 
recent movements to expand non-ICSID investment arbitration services, which 
could potentially contravene existing relevant Chinese laws and judicial 
practice, and it explores the prospects for non-ICSID investment arbitration in 
China. The article first compares ICSID and non-ICSID investment arbitration 
to determine the differences between them and their respective selling points for 
stakeholders in investment disputes. Next, the article examines the diverse 
mechanisms involved and highlights the different rules that govern non-ICSID 
arbitration, including the rules established by Chinese arbitration institutions in 
recent years. The article then further analyzes the obstacles in existing Chinese 
legislation and judicial practice that have impeded the use of non-ICSID 
investment arbitration in China. Finally, after briefly introducing proposals to 
remove these obstacles, the article examines the future prospects for Chinese 
non-ICSID investment arbitration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing number of investment arbitration treaties, 
international arbitration has gradually conquered the investment dispute 
resolution market by taking the place of various prior inefficient dispute 
resolution methods.1 As a more popular tool for resolving investment 
disputes between private investors and host states, international arbitration 
is constantly evolving and developing versatile regimes and mechanisms to 
fulfill the different demands and respond to feedback and questions from 
clients.2 There are generally three types of investment arbitration: 1) the 
most frequently used International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) Convention, which includes arbitration regimes registered 
under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules; 2) other 
frequently used regimes organized under the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules; and 3) 
arbitration regimes administered by various international arbitration 
institutions under institutional arbitration rules, such as the Arbitration 
Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Practitioners have further 
classified these three regimes into two categories ICSID and non-ICSID 
investment arbitration due to the different rules governing their arbitration 
procedures and enforcement of outcomes. With China increasingly 
becoming an important player in the world of international economics, the 
country has intensively reformed and internationalized its arbitration regime 
to capture more of the investment dispute resolution market. This article 
introduces and examines Chinese arbitration institutions’ recent movements 
toward expanding their non-ICSID investment arbitration services, which 
could potentially contravene existing relevant Chinese law and judicial 
practice. 
The article first compares ICSID and non-ICSID investment 
arbitration to examine their differences and respective selling points for 
                                                          
 1 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in 
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 14, 96 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
 2 Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy 
and Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 745 (2008); Vincent 
O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Convention for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 
21, 21 (2001). 
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stakeholders in investment disputes. Then, this article examines the diverse 
mechanisms involved and highlights the different rules that govern non-
ICSID arbitration, including the arbitration rules established by Chinese 
arbitration institutions in recent years. This article then further analyzes the 
obstacles in existing Chinese legislation and judicial practice that have 
impeded non-ICSID investment arbitration in China. Finally, after briefly 
introducing proposals to remove these obstacles, this article examines the 
future prospects for Chinese non-ICSID investment arbitration. 
2. ICSID OR NON-ICSID INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism based on the disputants’ 
mutual consent. In the sphere of investment arbitration, such consent is not 
just limited to private investors and host states but can also involve 
agreements between home states and host states. Therefore, investor-state 
investment arbitration is more complicated than pure commercial 
arbitration due to the involvement of multiple parties of interest and 
arbitration regimes. There are several situations when stakeholders are 
entitled to choose between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The first is 
when investment treaties between home states and host states explicitly 
provide for dispute resolution mechanisms, including ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration. For example, Article 26(4) of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) provides for investment arbitration under the ICSID and Additional 
Facility Rules, ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or 
an arbitration proceeding under the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.3 The second is when the home state and 
host state are both signatories to the ICSID Convention, and the investment 
dispute arises from a contractual relationship that includes an arbitration 
agreement for a proceeding under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or 
administered by an arbitration institution. The third is when disputants are 
free to select ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration based on mutual consent. 
Although parallel arbitration proceedings are rare, both ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration are frequently used to resolve investment disputes. 
Furthermore, with the increasing criticism of the ICSID system, 
stakeholders are considering non-ICSID arbitration to resolve their 
investment disputes more often, and accordingly, more arbitration 
institutions are expanding their relevant services.4 Nevertheless, it is 
impossible to propose a panacea for stakeholders to choose between ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration. The two regimes vary widely in many respects 
due to their divergent governing rules. 
                                                          
 3 The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100. The treaty was 
entered into force April, 16, 1988. 
 4 MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES § 3.09 (Oxford University Press, 2007); Kaj Hobér, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration and Its Future -- If Any, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 58, 60 (2015). 
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2.1. Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals is the cornerstone of such 
proceedings. Jurisdiction under the ICSID is described as follows: 
[A]ny legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.5 
This jurisdictional requirement is referred to as double-tier consent, as 
it includes consent between the home state and host state by signing the 
ICSID Convention in addition to the consent of the private investors who 
submit their disputes to the ICSID. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
provides several definitions of terms in this rule, including “national of 
another Contracting State” and the form of “consent.” The Convention 
explicitly excludes the formal diplomatic protection provided by home 
states. In addition, even if the home state and host state are not parties to the 
ICSID Convention, disputants can still submit their disputes to the ICSID 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
Jurisdiction under non-ICSID arbitration is also not difficult to 
explain. The most widely quoted requirement is provided in Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention, NYC), which only requires a written 
arbitration agreement for evidence of the parties’ consent to submit their 
disputes to arbitration.6 Many states have established more flexible 
requirements for the forms of arbitration agreements.7 In addition, it is 
widely established that arbitral tribunals are generally entitled to rule on 
their own jurisdiction, which is referred to as the “competence-competence” 
doctrine. The worldwide atmosphere of favoring international arbitration 
has fueled a clear tendency for arbitrators and national courts to confirm 
and support arbitral jurisdiction based on evidence of the parties’ explicit or 
implicit consent. In the specific area of investment arbitration, the only 
“obstacle” to jurisdiction is probably sovereign immunity, which provides 
that states that are immune to the jurisdiction of another sovereign. 
However, sovereign immunity is easy to overcome in both ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration because it can be waived by the states involved through 
                                                          
 5 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159, article 25 (hereinafter ICSID Convention). It 
entered into force on October 14, 1966. 
 6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 
1958, 330 UNTS 38 (hereinafter New York Convention). It entered into force on June 7, 
1959), 
 7 Anghélos C. Foustoucos, Conditions Required for the Validity of an Arbitration 
Agreement, 5 J. OF INT’L ARBITRATION 126, 128 (1988). 
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implicit and explicit consent to submit disputes to arbitration.8 In summary, 
jurisdiction under both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is clear and easy 
to identify with evidence of the disputants’ consent or investment treaties 
that designate the relevant dispute mechanisms. The biggest difference in 
initiating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is that ICSID arbitration is 
provided for in investment treaties and the ICSID Convention, and it is 
ready for use in all qualified disputes that may arise afterward. Non-ICSID 
arbitration must be explicitly selected in an arbitration agreement, and it is 
generally difficult for private investors to persuade host states to adhere to 
such agreements, especially when there is no direct contractual relationship 
between them. 
2.2. Procedure 
Investment disputes involve state parties, public law issues, and 
complicated controversies. Both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitral proceedings 
rely on mature and well-organized procedural rules to provide smooth 
processes. ICSID arbitration complies with the ICSID Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
(hereinafter referred to as the ICSID Rules), while most non-ICSID 
arbitration is organized under the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules or various 
institutional arbitration rules. Due to limitations on the scope of this 
research, this article does not attempt to differentiate between every aspect 
of the ICSID Rules and the rules applied in non-ICSID arbitration. These 
two sets of arbitration rules generally follow similar dispute resolution 
patterns and due process standards, although they have different specific 
provisions. Some empirical research has indicated that there is a slight 
difference in the average length of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
proceedings, which may indicate that one proceeding is more efficient than 
another.9 However, such superiority is not clearly evidenced in the text of 
the relevant procedural provisions. With slight differences in the number of 
days, both sets of arbitration rules provide timely guidelines for different 
procedural processes and delegate tribunals ample discretion to coordinate 
arbitral proceedings. For example, in non-ICSID arbitration, Article 4 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that the respondent shall submit a 
response to the notice of arbitration within 30 days of its receipt,10 while the 
ICSID Rules impose no time limitation on this process but provide that the 
                                                          
 8 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B) 
(2006). 
 9 Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID 
or Not to ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES VOLUME 14, 285, 317 (Albert Jan van 
den Berg ed., 2009). 
 10 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, (2003). 
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requesting party shall propose the appointment of arbitrators within 10 days 
after registration of the request.11 
Another notable difference is that Article 46 of the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules provides that “[t]he award (including any individual or dissenting 
opinion) shall be drawn up and signed within 120 days after closure of the 
proceeding,” with an optional 60 day extension, while the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules do not impose any limitation on the period for the 
tribunal’s decision after closure of the hearings. Even with these 
differences, it is not possible to conclude that one procedure is faster or 
more efficient than the other, especially considering that the alleged 
difference in the average duration of proceedings in one empirical study 
was marginal compared to the duration of the entire process.12 
In addition, the availability and efficiency of interim measures are 
critical factors that are considered increasingly important in evaluating the 
effectiveness of a dispute resolution regime. It has been noted that ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration utilize different interim measure mechanisms.13 
However, the differences do not lie in the procedural rules. Both the ICSID 
and non-ICSID rules prescribe arbitral tribunals’ authority to issue interim 
decisions.14 In non-ICSID arbitration, the parties can also submit a request 
for interim measures to the national courts following national laws, while 
ICSID arbitration is generally considered to have exempted the jurisdiction 
of the national courts, even though Rule 39(6) of the ICSID Rules 
specifically states that the parties are allowed to request any judicial or 
other authority to order provisional measures based on mutual consent.15 
Notably, in enforcing and executing tribunals’ interim decisions, sovereign 
immunity problems are often inevitable, as in the final award enforcement 
stage, which will be described in a later section. 
As two separate arbitration regimes dedicated to resolving investment 
disputes, the differences between the ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
procedural rules are a matter of course. However, there is no persuasive 
evidence to prove that the relevant differences have resulted in different 
levels of effectiveness in resolving disputes. Furthermore, the two regimes 
are continuously developing and cross-fertilizing each other. UNCITRAL 
established the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
                                                          
 11 International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes, ICSID Convention, 
Regulations and Rules (Apr. 10, 2006). 
 12 GAETAN VERHOOSEL, supra note 9, at 306. 
 13 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in 
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 14 95,145 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
 14 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 47; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra 
note 10, Article 26. 
 15 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 39; ETI Euro Telecom International BV v. 
Republic of Bolivia, EWCA Civ 880 (2008). 
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Investor-State Arbitration (“the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules”), which 
have been widely praised in practice.16 The ICSID recently published 
Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, which specifically increased 
the transparency requirements in the Arbitration Rules (including the 
Additional Facility Rules), in response to relevant criticism.17 
2.3. Annulment or Set Aside 
Proponents frequently describe the ICSID arbitration regime as self-
contained and autonomous because the ICSID Rules delegate the authority 
for initiating ICSID arbitral proceedings and supervising the awards in the 
ICSID system.18 The only supervision mechanism is an annulment review 
by an ad hoc Committee of three people constituted based on Article 52 of 
the ICSID Convention. This annulment process does not work as an appeals 
system in which the appellant authority can revise a previous award based 
on its own discretion. The ad hoc committee can only annul previous 
awards on the exclusive grounds provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.19 After awards have been fully or partially annulled, the parties 
can submit the dispute to a new tribunal and restart the arbitral 
proceedings.20 Academics have noted that the drafters of the ICSID 
Convention believed that finality and the procedural integrity of the system 
was more valuable than substantive correctness; thus, the relevant provision 
only provides for a limited and extraordinary remedy for arbitral awards.21 
The supervision mechanism in non-ICSID arbitration is a different 
story. As with commercial arbitration, two types of jurisdictions hold vital 
positions in the execution of effective judicial supervision in the post award 
stage. The first is ‘primary jurisdiction’, where the arbitration is held, while 
the second is ‘secondary jurisdiction’, where the arbitral award is 
enforced.22 In traditional ‘seat’ theory,23 national courts have primary 
jurisdiction and are entitled to set aside arbitral awards, which invalidates 
                                                          
 16 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/
Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (last visited September 22, 2018). 
 17 Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_One.pdf (last visited September 22, 2018). 
 18 JOHN CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, The Evolution of the ICSID System as an Indication of 
What the Future Might Hold, in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE? ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 17, 565 
(Kluwer Law International, 2013). 
 19 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, article 52. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Kateryna Bondar, Annulment of ICSID and Non-ICSID Investment Awards: 
Differences in the Extent of Review, 32 J INT’L ARB. 621, 676 (2015); RUDOLF DOLZER & 
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 279 (Oxford, 2008). 
 22 Id. 
 23 F.A. MANN & LEX FACIT ARBITRUM, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM 
FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157, 159 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1967). 
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the awards per se and makes them unenforceable everywhere, while under 
secondary jurisdiction, national courts can only refuse to recognize or 
enforce arbitral awards. Thus, many academics contend that the authority 
granted under primary jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award is the most 
effective mechanism for the supervision of an international arbitration 
process.24 Based on this consideration, many international and national laws 
prescribe the authority of national courts with primary jurisdiction and the 
grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. Some international rules have 
attempted to unify the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. For 
example, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law25 and Article IX of the 
1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
(hereinafter the European Convention of 1961)26 stipulate detailed grounds 
for setting aside arbitral awards. In practice, national courts are more 
inclined to review awards based on their own national provisions.27 
Lacking uniform international grounds for setting aide arbitral awards 
not only greatly increases the uncertainty in non-ICSID arbitration but also 
makes it difficult to evaluate and compare the review standards under 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Thus, forum shopping is inevitable. 
States that provide more internationalized and arbitration-friendly set-aside 
grounds are more popular as arbitration forums than those states that exert 
rigorous scrutiny on arbitral awards. Empirical data may add another 
perspective to this comparison. One study found that the annulment ratio in 
the case of ICSID awards was significantly higher than the set-aside ratio 
for non-ICSID treaty awards.28 While admitting that the population was too 
small to serve as a basis for any broad conclusions, the research identified 
some underlying reasons for this measurable difference, such as divergent 
review standards, inconsistencies inherent in the ICSID system, and the 
widely used forum shopping in non-ICSID arbitration.29 In practice, the 
ICSID annulment process received substantial criticism, particularly with 
respect to its consistency and transparency, which ultimately led to a 
                                                          
 24 W. Michael Reisman, SYSTEM OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 140,127-8 (1992). 
 25 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model 
Law], WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, U. N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008), Article 34 
& Article 36 (1)(a)(v). 
 26 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION OF 1961 
[hereinafter European Convention of 1961] (April 21, 1961), UNTS vol. 484, p. 364 No. 
7041 (1963-1964). 
 27 Meng Chen & Chengzhi Wang, Vanishing Set-Aside Authority in International 
Commercial Arbitration, 18 INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 131, 158 (2018). 
 28 Of the fifteen ad hoc committee decisions, forty percent led to annulment: twenty 
percent annulled the entire award and twenty percent were partial annulments. Of the sixteen 
court decisions, only one (six percent of the total) led to a set-aside of an award, and even 
that was only partial. Gaetan Verhoosel, supra note 5. 
 29 Gaetan Verhoosel, supra note 5. 
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backlash against investment dispute resolution under the ICSID regime.30 
2.4. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The enforcement of awards rendered under the ICSID is governed by 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention),31 while most 
enforcement of non-ICSID awards is governed by the New York 
Convention.32 The most significant selling point for ICSID arbitration is its 
delocalization and self-contained enforcement mechanism.33 According to 
the ICSID Convention, the contracting States are obliged to recognize and 
enforce awards as if they were a final judgment of a court in their territory, 
without any prior review on the basis of their national laws.34 Failure to 
comply with this provision constitutes breach of bilateral and multilateral 
treaty obligations, e.g., those contained in BITs and in the ICSID 
Convention. Therefore, the enforcement of ICSID awards is generally not a 
serious problem, and voluntary payment is the ordinary practice.35 
Notably, to avoid repetitive remedies, Article 27 prevents the 
contracting states from providing formal “diplomatic protection” or 
bringing an “international claim” based on an investment dispute.36 In 
addition, noncompliance with a rendered award can be remedied through 
the use of Article 64, which enables the contracting state of an investor to 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).37 In addition 
to the enforcement mechanisms provided for in the ICSID Convention, 
scholars and practitioners have explored many other instruments to enhance 
the enforcement of ICSID awards, including utilizing World Bank facilities 
                                                          
 30 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
(Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010); Brigitte 
Stern, The Future of ICSID, Ad Hoc Committees, Appelate Tribunals, International 
Investment Courts and Investment Arbitration: Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE?, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 17, 559-562 
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2013); Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New 
Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2003). 
 31 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND 
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES [hereinafter Washington Convention] March 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, Article 25(1). 
 32 New York Convention, supra note 6. 
 33 Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective? 15 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 455 (2004). 
 34 Katharina Diel-Gligor, Competing Regimes in International Arbitration: Choice 
Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 677 (2011). 
 35 Antonio Parra, The Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 24th Joint Colloquium on 
International Arbitration (Paris, Nov. 16, 2007), 1&3, retrieved from http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12144885278400/enforcement of_icsid_awards.pdf (last visited September 
19, 2018); Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson & Nigel Blackaby, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 107 
(2004). 
 36 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 27. 
 37 Katharina Diel-Gligor, supra note 34. 
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and relevant political influence.38 For example, one commentator suggested 
that the World Bank could punish noncompliance with investment 
arbitration awards through indirect means by suspending financing to the 
noncompliant member, similar to the penalties incurred by members for 
nonpayment of World Bank loans.39 Political approaches are not new 
instruments for resolving investment disputes, as they have proven to be 
inefficient and sometimes can increase the illegitimacy in investment 
disputes. The birth of the ICSID and other alternative resolution methods 
was aimed at taking the place of traditional investment dispute resolution 
mechanisms by establishing a uniform and fair international regime. 
Politicalizing the enforcement of ICSID awards seems to contradict the 
general purpose of the ICSID Convention. 
After entering into force, the New York Convention successfully 
established a uniform worldwide enforcement regime for international 
arbitral awards. Enforcement courts can only refuse recognition and 
enforcement of qualified arbitral awards based on the grounds exclusively 
provided for in Article 5 of the New York Convention.40 Although the 
enforcement regime under the New York Convention is generally 
considered to be efficient, national courts inevitably and unsurprisingly 
accept jurisdiction and decide controversial issues in accordance with their 
own national laws and procedures, which results in uncertainty and 
inconsistency in outcomes.41 More controversially, court decisions may also 
be influenced by local legal, cultural, economic, and political systems. 
Therefore, the enforcement regime for non-ICSID awards under the New 
York Convention is generally considered less favorable than the 
Washington Convention. 
In addition, there is one common obstacle in the enforcement of both 
ICSID and non-ICSID awards, which is the sovereign immunity defense in 
the enforcement stage. Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine that 
prohibits the national courts of one state from exercising jurisdiction over 
other states.42 This doctrine further extends to the execution process, which 
indicates that states’ assets are immune to the execution of any other state’s 
authority. By signing a BIT or contract designating arbitration as the 
                                                          
 38 LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, supra note 35, at 5. 
 39 Joseph M. Cardosi, Precluding the Treasure Hunt: How the World Bank Group Can 
Help Investor Circumnavigate Sovereign Immunity Obstacles to ICISID Award Execution, 
41 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 162-63 (2013). 
 40 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 
327 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981); RICHARD B. LILLICH & CAHRLES N. 
BROWER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” 
AND UNIFORMITY 38 (Transnational Publishers, 1992). 
 41 Julian D M Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine The International 
Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 498 (2009). 
 42 DHISADEE CHAMLONGRASDR, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY AND ARBITRATION 69-70 
(Cameron May Ltd., 2007) (asserting that when states conduct commercial acts, the 
rationales for sovereign immunity no longer apply). 
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dispute resolution mechanism, a state is considered to have waived its 
immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts for proceedings 
concerning the arbitral process.43 However, jurisdictional immunity and 
execution immunity are generally considered separate; most countries 
currently do not extend such jurisdictional immunity to execution 
proceedings.44 Therefore, stakeholders frequently find themselves having to 
revisit the sovereign immunity defense in the enforcement stage. Neither 
the New York Convention nor the Washington Convention addresses the 
issue of sovereign immunity defenses to the enforcement or execution of 
awards rendered pursuant to the treaty. This omission is explicit in the 
Washington Convention, which provides that the domestic law of immunity 
is not affected by the provisions of the Convention.45 The New York 
Convention does not explicitly address the issue of sovereign immunity, but 
enforcement courts have refused enforcement based on its rationale 
according to either the “commercial character reservation” or “public policy 
doctrine” provided in Article 1(3) and Article 5 of the New York 
Convention, respectively.46 Some enforcement courts have even 
refused to find that its national provisions specifically abrogate sovereign 
immunity in execution proceedings.47 Many commentators have declared 
sovereign immunity to be the most significant deficiency in the 
enforcement of arbitral investment awards. Considering the fragmented 
national laws regarding the issue of sovereign immunity in execution, some 
states have persisted with an absolute immunity doctrine; thus, establishing 
a uniform international approach to settle the sovereign immunity defense 
in the enforcement of arbitral investment awards is impractical in the near 
future.48 One approach is that some states have shifted from traditional 
doctrines of the absolute immunity of states to a restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity,49 which holds that sovereign immunity can be 
                                                          
 43 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B) 
(2006). 
 44 Alexis Blane, Sovereign Immunity As Bar to the Execution of International Arbitral 
Awards, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 453, 505, n. 23 (2009). 
 45 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at 461. 
 46 Hazel Fox, State Immunity and the New York Convention, in ENFORCEMENT OF 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 829, 829-32 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds., 
2008). 
 47 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at 462. 
 48 August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from 
Enforcement Measures, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 803 (2006); CHAMLONGRASDR, supra note 
42. 
 49 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at note 20 (“[I]n adopting a restrictive theory, the 
International Law Commission traces this evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 
various countries. The restrictive theory began in Italy, Belgium, and Egypt and spread 
throughout the developed world. Countries in the developing world have also been adopting 
the restrictive approach, though not all have done so, and the codifications of sovereign 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:249 (2019) 
260 
overcome when a state engages in commercial activities.50 Many decisions 
made by courts located in the United States and Europe have upheld this 
tendency, although with divergent standards for identifying “commercial 
activities”.51 
2.5. Summary 
Unlike ICSID arbitration, in which decisions are published and 
updated by the ICSID in a timely manner, non-ICSID arbitration cases are 
more confidential and difficult to statistically analyze because they are 
administered by different authorities, and most non-ICSID arbitration 
regimes that hear investor-state disputes do not maintain a public registry.52 
Several empirical studies have attempted to compare the popularity of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration for investment dispute resolution. 
Although the numbers may vary slightly, it is generally understood that 
ICSID arbitration has a longer history and has a much larger share of the 
investment dispute resolution market. For example, prior to 2007, empirical 
data indicated that nearly 74.4% of such decisions were rendered under the 
ICSID (59.8% under the ICSID Convention and 14.6% under the ICSID 
Additional Facility), and the remaining 25.6% were resolved under either 
the SCC or other ad hoc rules.53 The ratio has fluctuated slightly in recent 
years, but the ICSID still administers a major proportion of all investment 
arbitration proceedings.54 Some studies have attempted to explore the 
reasons why one arbitration system might be prioritized over another. 
Examinations and comparisons of factors such as subject matter, amounts 
claimed, amounts rewarded, and identities of winners did not provide clear 
evidence proving that there are major differences between the two 
regimes.55 There is certainly no clear evidence proving that ICSID 
arbitration is faster or more favorable to certain disputants than other 
arbitration forums. Comparisons between the procedural rules that are 
applied in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration have found several differences 
with regard to jurisdiction, interim measures, and supervision mechanisms. 
However, empirical data indicate that the different governing rules do not 
result in major differences in their effectiveness in resolving investment 
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disputes. Non-ICSID arbitration is thus a workable option for resolving 
investment disputes. 
3. VARIABLE NON-ICSID INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
Many entities provide investment dispute resolution services based on 
their respective rules. Even the ICSID frequently provides administrative 
assistance to investor-state arbitration proceedings under the UNCITRAL 
Rules, free trade agreements, and other ad hoc dispute settlement 
provisions.56 In addition to administering UNCITRAL arbitrations, the 
ICSID has also assisted with the organization of hearings in arbitration 
proceedings conducted under the auspices of the ICC, LCIA, PCA, and 
other institutions.57 Among the various institutions that administer 
investment arbitration proceedings, the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Rules are the third 
most commonly used set of arbitration rules in investment disputes, making 
the SCC the second largest arbitration institute in the world, after the 
ICSID, for the administration of investment disputes.58 Given the backlash 
against the ICSID system and the continued development of international 
investment, more and more international institutions have endeavored to 
obtain a share of the investment dispute resolution market. Three Chinese 
arbitration institutions have published their own investment arbitration rules 
to test the market in the last two years. Although neither has administered a 
real case yet, nor have the obstacles that exist in Chinese legislation and 
judicial practice been overcome to support the national “Belt and Road” 
policy, the entire Chinese arbitration community has begun to discuss 
whether the country has reached the moment for it to embrace non-ICSID 
arbitration. 
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3.1. Institutional or UNCITRAL Rules 
After the ICSID Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are the 
second most frequently used investment arbitration mechanisms. Due to the 
complexity of investment disputes, some investment arbitration proceedings 
administered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules still rely on the 
assistance of certain institutions. Such assistance ranges from support in 
organizing hearings to acting as the appointing authorities and deciding on 
proposals for the disqualification of arbitrators. In 2017, the SCC 
administered eight investment treaty arbitration cases, six of which were 
organized according to the SCC Arbitration Rules, one was under the 
UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules, and one was an Emergency Arbitration.59 In 
total, the SCC has administered 100 investment treaty disputes, with 74% 
administered under the SCC Rules, 21% under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, and 5% under ad hoc rules.60 Similar to the UNCITRAL, the SCC 
has not established arbitration rules specifically tailored to investment 
arbitration, which means that an arbitration proceeding in which the dispute 
concerns a claim based on an investment protection agreement is initiated 
in the same way as an ordinary commercial arbitration proceeding. This 
section compares the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules with the SCC 
Arbitration Rules to explore the fitness of applying traditional commercial 
arbitration regimes to resolve investment disputes. 
Both the SCC and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide detailed 
provisions regulating each process of an arbitral proceeding, from 
commencement of the arbitration, to rendering arbitral awards. Both rules 
set timely guidelines for the duration of each process and delegate broad 
discretion to arbitral tribunals to coordinate the arbitral proceedings. In 
addition to differences in technical rules regarding cost calculations and 
time periods, other significant differences between the SCC and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules include the following: 
1) Consolidation of arbitration: Article 12-14 of the SCC Arbitration 
Rules govern the involvement of additional parties, multiple contracts and 
other arbitration proceedings into a single proceeding, while the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include a similar provision. Although 
consolidating arbitration proceedings entails several practical difficulties, it 
can significantly decrease the costs and promote the settlement of multiple 
related disputes.61 The effectiveness of its application in investment 
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arbitration proceedings is uncertain, but many institutions have added 
similar provisions to their arbitration rules in recent years, which implies 
that there is a potential market for this service.62 
2) Appointing authority: As arbitration rules designed for ad hoc 
proceedings, UNCITRAL does not have a permanent body to provide case 
administration services; instead, it delegates appointing authorities to 
facilitate arbitral proceedings. The parties can select the appointing 
authorities for their case, and the Rules also designate the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague (hereinafter 
called the “PCA”) as the default appointing authority in cases where the 
parties cannot reach an agreement. The functions of appointing authorities 
include appointing arbitrators pursuant to Articles 8, 9, 10 or 14 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and deciding on challenges to arbitrators.63 
The SCC Arbitration Rules designate the board of directors (the “Board”) 
of the SCC for similar functions. 
3) Place of arbitration: The significance of the forum for international 
arbitration proceedings cannot be understated. It determines the national 
procedural laws that govern the arbitral proceedings and the competent 
national courts that have the authority to set aside awards. The parties are 
free to agree on the forum. If they cannot reach an agreement, the SCC and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules delegate the Board and the arbitral tribunal, 
respectively, to decide the place of arbitration.64 
4) Time limit for final award: Article 43 of the SCC Arbitration Rules 
requires that the arbitral tribunal render the final award no later than six 
months from the date the case was referred to it, with optional extensions 
granted by the Board, while the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not have 
similar requirements. The ICSID Convention also sets a 120-day limit for 
final awards.65 
5) Exclusion of liability: Both sets of rules exempt arbitrators, 
appointing authorities and any expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal from 
liability for any act or omission in connection with the arbitration, with the 
exception of intentional wrongdoing.66 The SCC Arbitration Rules extend 
this exemption to the SCC and its administrative secretary but with the 
exceptions of international misconduct and gross negligence.67 
6) Emergency arbitrators: The SCC established a set of rules for the 
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appointment of arbitrators for emergency decisions.68 Data indicate that 
emergency arbitrators are occasionally used in investment arbitration 
proceedings; for example, the SCC administered one emergency investment 
arbitration proceeding in 2017.69 
7) Specific rules for investment arbitration: Although the SCC does 
not have a specific set of rules for investment arbitration, it has added 
several provisions that are specifically applied in such proceedings. These 
provisions mainly govern submissions by non-disputing treaty parties or a 
third person.70 Notably, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules include 
similar provisions. 
8) UNCITRAL Transparency Rules: The UNCITRAL Transparency 
Rules, which came into effect on April 1, 2014, are a set of procedural rules 
that provide for transparency and public accessibility in treaty-based 
investor-state arbitration. The Transparency Rules are not limited to 
arbitration proceedings conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
and are also available for use in investor-state proceedings initiated under 
rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or in ad hoc 
proceedings. After the Rules were published, they received many positive 
comments from practitioners.71 Later, the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration (the Mauritius 
Convention) was opened for signatures on March 17, 2015. In contrast, the 
SCC Arbitration Rules provide that the proceedings are generally 
confidential, if the parties do not agree otherwise.72 
3.2. Emerging Investment Arbitration Market in China 
Non-ICSID investment arbitration remains a closed market in China. 
Three Chinese arbitration institutions have attempted to explore the 
provision of investment arbitration services. The first was the Shenzhen 
Court of International Arbitration (SCIA), located in Shenzhen, Guangdong 
Province. The SCIA was the southern subunit of the largest Chinese 
arbitration institution, the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIEATC), declaring itself independent of the 
CIEATC in 2012 and changing its name to the SCIA.73 In late 2017, the 
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SCIA merged with another local arbitration institution, the Shenzhen 
Arbitration Commission.74 The newly organized institution is still in a 
transitional period. The SCIA revised its arbitration rules in 2016 and added 
“arbitration cases related to investment disputes between states and 
nationals of other states” to its jurisdiction.75 The other SCIA Arbitration 
Rules are similar to other institutional arbitration rules and are applied 
indistinguishably in both traditional commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration proceedings administered by the SCIA. In addition, the SCIA 
has also administered arbitration cases subject to the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. Theoretically, the SCIA can administer investment 
arbitration cases under both the SCIA and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
However, two years after the promulgation of the new SCIA Arbitration 
Rules, the SCIA still has not received a single investment arbitration 
request. The underlying reasons for this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Another arbitration institution that tested the investment arbitration 
market in China had a similar experience. The CIETAC was established by 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 
Beijing in 1956.76 With its headquarters in Beijing, the CIETAC established 
the South Sub-Commission in Shenzhen, the Shanghai Sub-Commission, 
the Tianjin International Economic and Financial Arbitration Center 
(Tianjin Sub-Commission), and the Southwest Sub-Commission in 
Chongqing.77 The CIETAC rapidly developed into the busiest arbitration 
institution in the world. Notably, in 2012, the South Sub-Commission and 
the Shanghai Sub-Commission announced their independence from the 
CIETAC headquarters in Beijing.78 After this split, the CIETAC 
reestablished offices in Shanghai and Shenzhen and opened a new branch in 
Hong Kong. In 2017, the CIETAC published the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission International Investment 
Arbitration Rules (For Trial Implementation) (CIETAC Investment 
Arbitration Rules), which were effective on October 1, 2017. In contrast to 
the SCIA, the CIETAC decided to establish a specific set of rules for 
investment arbitration cases. In its guidelines, the CIETAC explained that, 
although Chinese arbitration law limits the application of arbitration to 
disputes between private parties, the entire Chinese arbitration community 
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has realized the significant potential of the Chinese investment arbitration 
market due to rapidly increasing foreign direct investment involving 
Chinese parties. Several international institutions are able to provide 
investment arbitration services, including the ICSID, SCC, and ICC. 
However, the relevant practice still takes place in a vacuum in China. 
Therefore, as the leader of the Chinese arbitration community, the CIETAC 
has attempted to become a pioneer in the development of non-ICSID 
investment arbitration in China and has clearly demonstrated its preparation 
by drafting its investment arbitration rules. In 2019, Beijing Arbitration 
Commission (BAC) followed the CIETAC’s model of expanding 
investment arbitration service by publishing its own draft of investment 
arbitration rules. Most of the provisions are modeled on the UNCITRAL 
and other institutional arbitration rules, although the following are 
noteworthy: 
1) Combination of arbitration and mediation: Almost all Chinese 
arbitration institutions have abundant experience combining mediation and 
arbitration cases due to the wide application and acceptance of mediation to 
resolve disputes.79 This preference is manifested in both the CIETAC 
Investment Arbitration Rules and the SCIA Arbitration Rules.80 
2) Transparency: In response to “legitimacy” questions regarding 
investment arbitration proceedings, the CIETAC Investment Arbitration 
Rules incorporate transparency requirements modeled on the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules. For example, Article 55 of the CIETAC Rules 
provides that the CIETAC can publish information about arbitral 
proceedings unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The Rules also include 
provisions governing submissions made by non-disputing parties and a 
third person. 
3) Third-party funding (TPF): Research has shown that arbitration 
cases regularly involve third-party funding.81 The involvement of TPF 
presents various challenges to many aspects of an investment arbitral 
proceeding, including: conflicts of interest, disclosure rules, and arbitration 
costs.82 There are currently few investment arbitration rules that include 
specific provisions related to TPF. Article twenty-seven of the CIETAC 
Rules defines the allowable scope of TPF in investment arbitration 
proceedings. It requires compulsory disclosure of the existence and nature 
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of TPF as soon as a TPF agreement is concluded and instructs tribunals to 
take TPF into consideration when awarding the costs of arbitration.83 
4) Place of arbitration: In contrast to other investment arbitration 
rules that delegate tribunals or other authorities to decide the forum for 
proceedings when the parties cannot reach an agreement, the CIETAC 
Rules stipulate, “where the parties have not agreed on the place of 
arbitration, the place of arbitration shall be the domicile of the IDSC or the 
CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center that administers the case.”84 In 
fact, officials with the CIETAC recommend that stakeholders select Hong 
Kong as the place for investment arbitration to avoid application of the 
ambiguous and unfavorable Chinese Arbitration Law, the details of which 
will be described in the next chapter. 
4. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO NON-ICSID ARBITRATION IN 
CHINA 
The underlying reasons why only three arbitration institutions out of 
approximately 250 such institutions in China have explored providing 
investment arbitration services and neither of them have actually received 
any investment arbitration requests after publishing relevant rules are 
deeply rooted in Chinese legislation and judicial practice regarding non-
ICSID arbitration. The arbitration market in China is currently flourishing 
compared to the country’s outdated arbitration legislation and judicial 
system.85 Although the Chinese judicial system, which is led by the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC), has published a series of judicial 
interpretations to reform the country’s arbitration regime on issues such as 
ad hoc arbitration and judicial supervision and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, it has not yet properly addressed the subject of non-ICSID 
investment arbitration. In addition, no Chinese parties have been reported to 
have participated in any non-ICSID arbitration proceedings. Thus, to 
develop non-ICSID investment arbitration services, the obstacles in China’s 
legislation and judicial systems must be overcome. 
4.1. Jurisdiction 
Article 2 of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Chinese Arbitration Law, CAL) stipulates “[c]ontractual disputes between 
citizens of equal status, legal persons and other economic organizations and 
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disputes arising from property rights may be put to arbitration,”86 which is 
generally interpreted as excluding investment disputes between private 
investors and host states. In addition, China declared a commercial 
reservation when the country joined the New York Convention, which 
means that China applies the Convention only to differences arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered 
commercial under its national law. Whether investment disputes between 
investors and host states are considered commercial at the international 
level is subject to debate.87 Article 2 of the Notice of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China explicitly 
stipulates: 
In accordance with the commercial reservation declaration made by 
China upon its accession to this Convention, China will apply the 
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the national law 
of the People’s Republic of China… except disputes between foreign 
investors and the host government.88 
Therefore, even though there may be arbitration agreements between 
investors and host states, as long as Chinese law is the governing law of the 
arbitration agreement, non-ICSID investment arbitration is impracticable, 
and enforcement courts may refuse to enforce arbitral awards. 
4.2. Procedure 
In addition to obstacles to arbitrability, due to the complexity of 
investment disputes, the parties normally select existing arbitration rules to 
govern their arbitral proceedings. As a highly autonomous dispute 
resolution mechanism, arbitration proceedings do not necessary rely on 
intervention by national courts.89 As stated above, three Chinese institutions 
have established their own investment arbitration rules and have offered to 
administer arbitration cases based on UNCITRAL arbitration rules. 
However, there are a plethora of other international institutions that can 
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provide investment arbitration services, and parties with business in China 
have many choices of both arbitration rules and entities to manage the 
cases. 
The most significant difference when commencing investment 
arbitration in Mainland China is the involvement of the local national courts 
in supporting the arbitral proceedings, including facilitating the 
enforcement of interim measures. The relevant provisions are Article 101 of 
The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 
Revision) (Chinese Civil Procedure Law), Articles 28 and 68 of the Chinese 
Arbitration Law, and Article 2 of the Notice of the Supreme People’s Court 
on several issues concerning the implementation of the Arbitration Law of 
the PRC, which generally provide that disputants who are parties to an 
arbitration proceeding administered by a Chinese arbitration institution can 
apply to the Chinese courts at the location of the assets or dependents to 
issue evidence and property security orders.90 First, the relevant Chinese 
laws only confirm that Chinese courts can issue interim orders and are 
silent on whether arbitral tribunals have the same authority. Therefore, 
Chinese courts will not facilitate the enforcement of interim orders made by 
arbitral tribunals that are in forms other than arbitral awards. In practice, if 
the parties submit a request for interim measures to an arbitral tribunal or 
institution, the parties are often directed to transfer their requests to the 
competent Chinese courts instead of providing interim orders on their own. 
Second, it is subject to debate whether the parties to an arbitration 
proceeding administered by a foreign arbitration institution or an ad hoc 
arbitration proceeding can submit requests for interim measures to the 
Chinese courts. Without a clear delegation of such authority in Chinese 
legislation, it is unlikely that Chinese courts will grant such requests. In 
addition, if arbitral tribunals make interim orders in the forms of arbitral 
awards, then the awards can be enforced according to the New York 
Convention and relevant Chinese laws. However, as manifested in Article 
26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and in other institutional 
arbitration rules, arbitral tribunals can provide interim orders in the form of 
temporary measures at any time prior to the issuance of the award that 
finally decides the dispute.91 Thus, the support for enforcing interim 
measures in investment arbitration cases provided for in Chinese law is 
quite limited. 
4.3. Enforcement 
If the issue of arbitrability is not considered the most significant 
obstacle to commencing non-ICSID investment arbitration in China, the 
missing enforcement mechanism is likely the most problematic. 
                                                          
 90 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the PRC (Fa Fa [1997]No.4) 
 91 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 26. 
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Enforcement of non-ICSID investment arbitral awards in Mainland China 
can encounter at least three problems: 1) the lack of a legal basis, 2) public 
policy defenses, and 3) sovereign immunity. 
1) Lack of a legal basis: As described above, China declared a 
commercial reservation when signing the New York Convention, and the 
SPC explicitly excluded investment disputes between investors and host 
states from commercial arbitration, which leads to the simple outcome that 
non-ICSID investment arbitral awards cannot be enforced in China based 
on the New York Convention. Article 283 of the Chinese Civil Procedure 
Law provides that requests for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to 
Chinese courts shall be decided in accordance with international treaties 
concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or based on the 
principle of reciprocity.92 If the New York Convention is deemed not 
applicable, without any other governing international treaty, the 
enforcement of non-ICSID investment arbitral awards in China must rely 
on the national courts’ ambiguous interpretation of the principle of 
reciprocity. Considering that there are no non-ICSID investment arbitral 
awards involving Chinese parties that have been reported or enforced by a 
foreign court, it is not likely that Chinese courts will grant enforcement 
requests based on the principle of reciprocity. 
2) Public policy defense and sovereign immunity: These two obstacles 
are grounded on the same rationale that sovereign assets are immune from 
enforcement and execution by any foreign authorities. The former defense 
originated with Article 5 of the New York Convention, while the latter is 
grounded in customary international law. Article 55 of the ICSID 
Convention makes clear that the collection procedure in Article 54 shall not 
“be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State 
relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.”93 
Efforts have been made to reach an international consensus on the rules of 
state immunity.94 To date, there are two conventions that provide rules on 
state immunity: the European Convention on State Immunity (“ECSI”) and 
the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property (“UNCSI”).95 Due to widely varying national legislations 
regarding sovereign immunity, there are a limited number of states that 
have signed these two conventions. In fact, the UNCSI has not even been 
implemented due to an insufficient number of signatories. Without a 
prevailing international interpretation of sovereign immunity, the national 
laws of enforcement govern the enforcement of investment arbitral awards 
                                                          
 92 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼
法) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 Revision)](promulgated 
by 7th Standing Meeting National People’s Congress, April 9, 1991), Article 283. 
 93 ICSID Convention, Article 55. 
 94 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IMMUNITY, May 16, 1972, 1495 UNTS 181. 
 95 G.A. Res. 59/38, United Nations Convension on Jurisdiction Immunities of States and 
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Embracing Non-ICSID Investment Arbitration 
39:249 (2019) 
271 
rendered under both the ICSID and non-ICSID regimes. For example, the 
United States promulgated the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to 
codify state immunity,96 which was followed by the United Kingdom97, 
Australia98, and others. It is also common for national courts to identify 
national rules regarding sovereign immunity as a public policy that shall not 
be violated in the enforcement process.99 Due to the limitations of this 
research and the complexity of the immunity issue, this article does not 
undertake a detailed examination of the various state immunity practices.100 
In contrast to the ongoing transition from the absolute immunity doctrine to 
the restrictive immunity doctrine in other states, under Chinese legislation 
and in Chinese courts, states are absolutely immune from adjudication by 
foreign authorities (jurisdictional immunity), and state assets are immune 
from execution in any enforcement proceedings unless the involved states 
waive such presumptive immunity.101 China has not codified a national law 
to govern the issue of state immunity. The relevant provisions are 
incorporated in various laws, such as the Chinese Civil Procedural Law, the 
People’s Republic of China Regulations Concerning Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities, and the People’s Republic of China Law on Enforcement 
Immunity of Foreign Central Banks’ Property. In practice, national courts 
located in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau have consistently 
denied jurisdiction in cases with sovereign states as defendants, and the 
country has also resisted foreign jurisdiction or refused to waive immunity 
when it is designated as a defendant.102 The most recent instance was in 
2011 in FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, in which the Hong Kong Supreme Court ultimately denied 
jurisdiction in a case between an American company and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo based on the Chinese National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee’s consistent interpretation of Chinese policy on 
absolute state immunity.103 Therefore, although the relevant national 
provisions regarding sovereign immunity are not conclusive and explicit, 
Chinese judicial practice continues to follow the absolute sovereign 
immunity doctrine. Without an explicit waiver of enforcement immunity by 
                                                          
 96 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq (1976). 
 97 State Immunity Act, 1978 (UK). 
 98 Foreign States Immunities Act, 1985 (Act No. 196/1985) (Austl.). 
 99 Stephan J. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration 141 (1990) 
 100 August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from 
Enforcement Measures, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 803 (2006). 
 101 HUANG YAYING (ED), CHINESE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW COURSE 320 (Xiamen 
University Press, 2017). 
 102 Id. 
 103 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, CACV 
373/2008 & 
CACV 43/2009 (Feb. 10, 2010), https://arbitrationlaw.com/sites/default/files/free_pdfs/fg_
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states, Chinese courts will refuse to enforce non-ICSID arbitral awards 
against any states. 
4.4. Prospects and Resolution 
China is experiencing a significant revolution in the arbitration area. 
The SPC has published a series of judicial interpretations to alleviate and 
resolve the limitations of the outdated Chinese arbitration legislation in its 
rapidly growing arbitration market. Under the national “Belt and Road” and 
Free Trade Zones policies, arbitration has been delegated the ambiguous 
mission of resolving both commercial and investment disputes. The 
revolution is reflected in the opening of Free Trade Zone ad hoc arbitration, 
the expanding validity of arbitration agreements, the lifting of limitations 
on services provided by foreign arbitration institutions, and the reforms to 
judicial review and the enforcement of arbitral awards.104 Several legal 
interpretations published by the SPC have exceeded what is allowed under 
existing Chinese legislation and have caused intense discussion in the 
arbitration community.105 In June 2018, the SPC established the 
International Commercial Tribunal to hear qualified cases involving 
international commercial issues to facilitate the “Belt and Road” policy and 
the needs of Chinese citizens who are deeply involved in international 
trade.106 The Chinese arbitration community is relying on the SPC to 
continue its innovation and to lead the revolution toward investment 
arbitration. Suggested measures include judicial interpretations regarding 
jurisdiction under non-ICSID investment arbitration, explanations of 
allowable interim measures, and interpretations of the scope of sovereign 
immunity and enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards under the New 
York Convention regime. Through the law revision process, the SPC’s 
judicial interpretations can have immediate and significant effects on 
initiating non-ICSID investment arbitration in China. 
In addition, the concurrent expansion of investment arbitration 
services provided by three Chinese arbitration institutions is not groundless. 
First, both have attempted to designate Hong Kong as the default forum for 
arbitration to avoid the application of unfavorable Chinese arbitration 
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laws.107 Second, if the ultimate arbitral awards do not have to be enforced in 
the territory of China but in a state that recognizes the restrictive sovereign 
immunity doctrine, enforcement is feasible as long as the applicants can 
locate qualified states’ assets that are used for commercial purposes.108 
Therefore, currently, the potential clients of the investment arbitration 
services provided by Chinese arbitration institutions are more likely to be 
Chinese investors who wish to sue foreign host states rather than investors 
who have disputes with China. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Both the ICSID and the international arbitration system are dynamic 
investment dispute resolution regimes that are evolving based on the rapidly 
changing international trade and economic structure. Recently, the ICSID 
proposed an amendment to its rules in response to a backlash and questions 
about its arbitration system. Many arbitration institutions and international 
entities are also devoted to expanding the investment arbitration market. 
With their divergent procedural rules and enforcement regimes, the ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration mechanisms meet different market demands in 
resolving investment disputes. The varied non-ICSID arbitration services 
provided by various institutions also enrich the investment dispute 
resolution market. By actively reforming and internationalizing its 
arbitration system, China can fulfill its ambition to play a more important 
role in the new international economic world. However, existing Chinese 
legislation and judicial practices still present formidable obstacles and 
cause significant uncertainty in commencing non-ICSID investment 
arbitration in China. The Chinese arbitration community expects the SPC to 
provide further judicial interpretations to support non-ICSID arbitration 
practice in China before unpredictable revisions of Chinese laws. Based on 
the SPC’s innovations in Chinese arbitration in recent years, such 
expectations are not groundless, but the fate of non-ICSID investment 
arbitration in China has still yet to be revealed. 
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